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INTRODUCTION
The world-wide socialist movement is a strong and successful 
political force in the modern world. From the long-run historical 
point of view, it is a new movement which has risen from insignif­
icance to worldwide influence in less than 150 years. But within 
this successful movement arises an exception: the United States.
Elsewhere in Western civilizations, Socialist parties have 
retained their strength or become stronger; while the Socialist 
Party of the United States (SP) has deteriorated to nothing.
One such Western civilization where the Socialist party 
represents a successful political force is in Italy. Here the 
Socialist Party (PSI) has enjoyed a century as Italy's third, 
sometimes second, major political party (except during the 
country's fascist rule). Italy, as opposed to the other Western 
European countries, is most similar to the United States in 
being "geographically isolated" from external political influ­
ences. Also, this Western European country illustrates a 
Socialist Party, like that of the United States, which was more 
ideologically Marxist than other Western European parties during 
its early years. Thus, this thesis chose the Italian Socialist 
Party as the measure by which to analyze the reasons for a 
Socialist Party failure in the United States versus its victory 
in Italy, if both Socialist parties were founded on the same 
Marxist tenets and witnessed, in their histories, similar 
successes and upheaveals, what were the factors dictating the 
rise of one and the fall of the other?
1
I. THE ITALIAN SOCIALIST PARTY
Unlike equivalent parties in the United Kingdom, Nest 
Germany, or Scandinavia, the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), 
is a great deal more "Marxist" than the SPD or the Labour 
Party at the level of ideology and party symbolism. This is 
due to the existence of the Communist Party (PCI) at the 
PSI's side in its early history. In general, the PSI has 
regarded the Communists as "misguided brethren", who share the 
same ideological purpose but who adopt mistaken and potentially 
dangerous means, rather than enemies which must be opposed.
The Socialist Party in Italy is based on actual member­
ship and on a highly centralised structure. It has never
2matched the size or efficiency of the Communist Party but by 
the mid-fifties it had re-established a national network of 
500,000 predominantly working-class members, based in the North 
and the Red Belt regions of Italy. However, due to factionali- 
zation, the structure of the Party changed from one similar to 
the Communist Party (in working class character), to one of 
increasing resemblance to the Christian Democratic Party (i.e. 
social groups from the South: white collar groups, professional 
classes, small farmers, artisans and shop-keepers) by the late 
sixties.
During the 1970's, the PSI had tried hard to rectify this 
image, and the reconciliation with the Communists formed part 
of an attempt to reassert traditional sociality values, in
2
3particular, the class basis of the Party. The Party claimed
to be going through a "process of self-examination in hopes
4to rediscover its vocation."
The failure of the PSI to unite and to represent the 
radical and labor elements in Italian society has been a major 
negative factor in Italian politics of the twentieth century. 
This failure can be attributed primarily to the inability of 
the Socialists to agree whether to seek their ends by revolu­
tionary or evolutionary means, or more precisely, whether to 
work within or against the system (the latter does not neces- 
arily involve violence). As a consequence, the history of 
the Italian Socialist party has been that of continual expul- 
sions, scissions, and reunifications.
a.
This history dates back 100 years to the establishment 
of the revolutionary Paris Commune of 1871, which was supported 
by such members of the radical left as Giuseppe Garibaldi,
Karl Marx, and Mikhail Bakunin, but dismissed by Giuseppe 
Mazzini, who was one of the Italian Socialist leaders most 
followed by those hopeful for social justice. When Mazzini 
died the following year, Bakunin took over the leadership 
among Italy's radical left, but this essentially traditional 
group did not agree with his violent words and deeds. In 1874, 
a general strike was crushed, and the moderates were able to
4form a labor party (Partlto operalo) in time to take part in 
the 1882 elections. This party, which disappeared a few years 
later, was replaced in 1892 by Italy's first Socialist party 
(Partito Socialista italiano, PSI). Its founder, Filippo 
Turati, like Mazzini, was more of an "evangelist" than a 
politician. He represented the extreme right of the labor 
movement in the sense that he distrusted violence and believed 
progress resulted from cooperation, compromise, and patient 
determination. His hatred of violence led him to take a 
pacifist stand in World War I, and his party was the major 
Socialist party in Europe to oppose the war consistently
7throughout its course.
However, those advocating revolution caused the party 
many difficulties. In 1908, Arturo Labriola and his followers
Qwere expelled from the party for their revolutionary doctrines. 
Four years later, the right wing Socialists who supported 
Italy's colonial war against Turkey were in turn expelled, and 
the leader of this faction, Leonida Bissolati, then founded
athe Partito Socialista riformista (Reformed Socialist Party).
One of those who advocated the expulsion of Bissolati was 
Benito Mussolini, who had himself just completed a prison 
term for acts of political violence. When the evolutionary 
Socialists (PSI) were again securely in power some left­
wingers, including Mussolini, were expelled; others, such as 
the founders of the Communist party, in 1921, Antonio Gramsci, 
Palmiro Togliatti, and Amadeo Bardisa, left of their own
5accord. ® During the elections of 1919, just after World War 
I, the Socialist Party received 2 million of the 5.5 million 
votes cast. However, by the mid-twenties, Mussolini began to 
rise to power. ^
When the Fascists came to power they were able to disband
all the Marxist opposition groups from Italy (except the
Communists, who remained and operated underground during the
12entire Fascist period). In 1930, most of the Socialist 
factions except the Communists succeeded in reuniting in exile 
in France and in forming the PS (SIIS) Partito socialists 
[Sezione Italians dell1 internazionale socialista] - Socialist 
Party [Italian Section of the Socialist international], which 
on reentering Italy after the Liberation became the PSIUP 
(Partito socialista italiano di unita proletaria - Italian 
Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity) by fusing with Lelio 
Basso's Unita proletaria groups.^ The PSIUP changed its 
name back to the PSI in February.
b.
The PSI's postwar history has been one of a continuous 
search for a satisfactory relationship with the two major 
parties of the political system, which leaves it with a dis­
tinctive political identity of its own. As various alliances 
have been tried, so a particular wing of the party has broken 
away or more rarely, the conditions have been created for the
6reconciliation and re-integration of a previously alienated 
14group.
Generally, the Socialist Party has experimented with 
three types of alliances. The first of these has been a left­
ward alliance with the Communist Party: a ”socialist alterna­
tive" platform. Under the leadership of Nenni during the 
most "intense” years of the Cold War, from 1947 until the mid-
1950*s, such an alliance was pursued by the PSI (at a time when
15the French Socialist Party was extremely anti-Communist).
It leu to the breakaway of Giuseppe Saragat*s Social Democrats -
the PSDI - in 1 9 4 7 , and also to electoral defeat in the 1948 
17election. Much more recently the concept of the "socialist 
alternative" has again found a place in PSI thinking, but under 
very different conditions. With the Italian Left clearly on 
the rise, international circumstances less tense, and the 
Italian Communist Party (PCI) offering an entirely different 
public image, the PSI chose this "alternative" lobby as its
18official long-term policy aim at the March 1976 PSI Congress.
The second type of alliance tried by the PSI has been in
the opposite direction: an alliance towards the Centre with
the Christian Democrats (DC) - the Centre-Left coalition.
This policy, cautiously developed from 1955 onwards, (when
the crisis in the international Communist movement provided
the PSI with the justification it needed for breaking away
19from its former collaboration with the Communists) came to
7fruition in 1963 with the entry of the PSI into Government
with the DC. This alliance brought the merger of the PSI
and the PSDI (Italian Social Democratic Party) in 1966, but
this rupture of relations with the PCI led to the breakaway
of the Socialist Party's left, which, in 1964, formed the
PSIUP. Unfortunately, the Centre-Left coalition, in electoral
terms, was not successful: in 1968, the combined PSI-PSDI vote
was 5.4 percent down on the figure for the two parties running
20separately in 1963.
Disillusionment with such a performance led the Socialist
Party, at the end of the 1960s, towards a third type of alli-
21ance strategy which can be referred to as 'consociational.'
The PSI abandoned its hopes of creating a dominant Social 
Democratic movement which, by extending its appeal over a 
wider area of the Italian Left, would isolate the Communists. 
Instead, due to the increase in working-class unrest at the end 
of the decade, the PSI tried to re-establish its links with 
the PCI, while not actually rupturing those with the Christian 
Democrats. This approach resembled that of the "Grand Coalition" 
of the three major parties (PCI, PSI, and DC) which ruled Italy 
from the Liberation to 1947. It was based on "equilibri piu 
avanzati" ('more advanced balances'): the idea being that 
Communist support in parliament would push the Socialist/ 
Christian Democratic coalition in a more advanced (i.e. more 
Leftward) direction. *
8The first consequence, which has already been shown, of 
the PSI's change of strategy in the late 1960s was the aliena­
tion of the Social Democrat group, and, in 1969, the PSDI was 
re-established as a separate party. On the Left, there were 
few favorable gains; the reconciliation with the PCI failed 
to attract back tc the Socialist Party those who, in 1964, 
had broken away to form the PSIUP. When the latter party
finally broke up in 1972, the majority of its followers went
23to the PCI, and only a few returned to the Socialist Party.
As the June 1976 elections neared, the economic strength 
of the PCI put the Party in a powerful position: which in 
turn placed the PSI in a difficult position. If the Socialist 
Party pursued the "consociational" strategy, the logical 
conclusion was Communist participation in government, which 
would leave little room for the Socialist Party. But to have 
abandoned such a strategy in favour of a Socialist "alternative 
alliance, with the Communists alone, was not possible either; 
the PSI was not ready to admit that the PCI was completely 
democratic, and many of its more moderate supporters did not 
agree with such a step. Plus, the PCI itself rejected the 
proposal.^
The PSI's solution to this political dilemma was to try 
to walk a delicate tightrope between two different strategies, 
the 'alternative' and the 'consociational,' while committing 
itself to neither. Therefore, the PSI, accepted the former
9strategy as its long-term goal, while pursuing a version of 
the latter strategy.
However, the results from the 1976 elections were not
favorable. The PSI's vote remained at 9.6 per cent while
25that of the PCI increased to over 34 per cent. The PSI*s 
figure was identical with that of the 1922 elections. The 
problem the PSI encountered was that, they had convinced 
the electorate that the PCI had sufficiently changed to make 
it a respectable coalition partner. This accommodation with 
the Communists influenced many Italians to vote for the PCI
26since both parties were going to work closely together anyway.
c.
In April 1979, Parliament was dissolved, so new national
elections were scheduled for June 3, 1979. The PSI was caught
in between the Christian Democrats (DC) and the PCI, so it
based its platform on the slogan: "The Socialists as a third
force that will break the hegemony of DC-PCI." The Communist
Party lost 4.0 percent of the votes it had won in 1976 while
27the Socialist Party gained 0.2 percent. The Christian 
Democrats were still the majority party, yet, while they 
refused to allow the Communists in the government, they could 
not govern without Communist support, which Enrico Berlinguer 
(communist party boss) had begun to withhold. Two coalitions 
seemed feasible: 1) an alliance between the DC and the PSI}
10
or 2) an alliance with the PSI, PSDI, and the Republicans
which would give the majority of 360 deputies against 270 for
the Communists and all other parties combined. Hence/ the
2 ftfive-party coalition was adopted.
In 1982, the PSI, although Italy's third major party, 
still had only 9.8 percent of the vote but held seven cabinet 
positions in the five-party coalition government, including 
finance and defense. Bettino Craxi wanted to form a govern­
ment with the Communists that would have excluded the Christian
Democrats, because he believed that the electorate was tired
29of the corruption and ineptness within the DCs. Hence, the 
PSI began its coalition agression. In August 1982, the seven 
Socialist cabinet members walked out, which forced the resigna­
tion of Giovanni Spadolini's (DC) thirteen-month-old govern­
ment. The Socialist Party claimed that the "pullout" was due 
to the unexpected defeat, in the Chamber of Deputies, of a bill 
they had sponsored to prevent tax evasion. The measure was 
defeated by thirty Christian Democrats. The Socialist Party 
charged that the five-party coalition was not living up to its 
promises of "economic severity with justice." Actually, what 
the PSI really wanted was the office of prime minister. So, 
they risked a calling for ar. election because with the ban on 
government participation by the powerful Communists, the PSI
held the political balance, so a majority could not have been
30formed without them. Five months later, in 1983, the PSI
11
once again withdrew from a four-party coalition government
which disintegrated the 43rd government since the Second
World War. Once again the PSI claimed that the Christian
Democrats had shifted to the right on social and political
31issues i.e. favoring centrist solutions.
d.
Following the general elections in June 1983, which saw
support for the Christian Democrats drop by 5.4 percent (an
all-time low) and increase by 2.0 percent for the Socialist 
32Party, Italy's President, Sandro Pertim, asked Bettino Craxi,
the PSI leader, to form the 44th government. As Prime minister,
with a coalition made up of the Socialists, the Christian
Democrats, the Liberals, the Republicans, and the Social
Democrats, Craxi led Italy's first Socialist government. To
make the coalition viable, Craxi had to reconcile the PSI's
expansionist economic policy with the "austerity*' measures
advocated by the right-wing Christian Democrats and Republicans.
Also, the PSI, though not Craxi himself, was opposed to those
who supported the NATO cruise missile deployment in Sicily.
Hence, while Craxi may have attained his goal of becoming
prime minister, Italy's political instability and economic
33recession needed to be solved.
The selection of a socialist for Italy's prime minister 
marked a move from conservatism to "Eurosocialism", where
12
communism is rejected. The PSI did not "believe in command
economics, they £elt that mass nationalizations were destructive
of productive capacities, and they attempted to introduce a
34greater discipline into economic and social policies."
Unlike Francois Mitterand in France, who attempt to apply 
"doctrinaire" socialist methods to his nation's economy and then 
found himself turning towards "austerity" economics to cut 
economic and political losses, Craxi began by imposing dis­
cipline and experiment instead of radical techniques coming 
from "sacred" texts.
By November 1985, Craxi's Socialist government had held
power longer than any other in postwar Italy, inflation had
been halved to eight percent, with the economy growing by 28
percent (the highest rate in Western Europe), and unemployment
rates checked. Although problems did occur, for the first
time over a foreign policy issue, Craxi resigned in October
due to Italy's handling of the Achille Lauro hijacking.
However, Craxi did return which allowed the same government
36with the same policies to continue.
Yet, on June 27, 1986, (PSI) Bettino Craxi once again 
resigned, until July 27, when the political crisis was ended 
with the five political parties of the previous coalition
37reaching a compromise to continue with a similar government. 
Craxi had resigned when at least seventy parliamentarians 
belonging to the coalition helped defeat a local finance bill.
13
This happened in a "secret vote" following an open vote in
which the "snipers" had stood up and "loyally" supported the
38piece of legislation the government had introduced. The 
PSI was notified that the DCs would accept Craxi's continuing 
as prime minister under one of two conditions: a) He could
remain until the next national elections, due in June 1988, 
if he committed the PSI to supporting a five-year DC prime 
ministership afterwards; or b) he could remain through Parlia­
ment's approval of the financial program for 1987, but not
beyond December 31. His commitment had to be in "writing and
39unequivocal."
The PSI leader completely rejected these proposals made 
by the DCs. Therefore, President Cossiga asked Foreign Minister 
(DC) Giulio Andreotti to form a government. However, Andreotti 
opted to find a compromise that would allow Craxi to remain; 
and yet, enable the DCs to attain their goal of the prime 
ministership because without the PSI's support, Andreotti 
could not have formed a new government. ® It was eventually 
agreed that Craxi would stay in office until March 1987. At 
that time, during the PSI national party congress, Craxi 
would be reelected as party secretary while supporting a DC 
auoceetor as prime minister until the parliamentary elections
A 1in dene 1988. Hence, the five-party coalition reached a 
compromise because no other majority seemed feasible.
Similar to that of the Italian Socialist Party, the 
Socialist Party of the United states (SP) advocated much of 
the same Marxian tenets and objectives, while experiencing an 
equal amount of compromises to be made and factional disputes. 
Both the PSI and the SP were founded around the same period,
1892 and 1901, respectively, to bring about social ownership 
and democratic management of the means of production, and to 
provide for better economic, social and political opportunities. 
In other words, the ideal-typical program of a socialist party 
wast nationalization of basic industries; a dominant public 
sector; equal income distribution; and central economic 
planning.42
At the outset, both the PSI and SP emerged as two parties 
with a positive force enabling each to become major factors in 
the political arena. As with the PSI membership, the Socialist 
Party in the United States, under the leadership of Eugene 
Debs, saw an increase from less than ten thousand to 150,000 
dues-paying members in its first twelve years. Plus, the 
SP's electoral strength increased from 95,000 to 900,000, 
while electing over two thousand of its members to public
43office in order to insure passage of hundreds of reforms.
So, as in Italy, the Socialist Party in the United States 
achieved some notable successes in the beginning of the
II. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE ITALIAN AND
UNITED STATES SOCIALIST PARTIES
14
15
twentieth century. The year 1912 represented the high point
for the SP, when Eugene Debs received six percent of the votes
in the presidential campaign which has never been equalled
44by any Socialist Party candidate since. Both the PSI and 
SP managed to Hsuccessfully repulse” attempts to "revolutionize 
the parties, which had caused the left of both the Italian and 
American parties to break off in the same year: 1919 to form
Communist parties.
During World War I, however, the two Socialist parties
diverged. The SP opposed the War, while their comrades in
Italy supported the war effort. This support holds true for
45most of the Western European Socialist parties. From then
on, until 1917, membership in the United States Socialist
Party declined, only to rise-by twelve thousand in the first
46three months after war was declared by the United States.
For both the Italian and American Socialist Parties, the 1920's
seemed to be the decade where each country's Socialist Party
was on the verge of "extinction.” When the Italian Fascists
came to power in 1922, as noted before, all socialist parties
were destroyed only to be reunited in France and to finally
return to Italy after the Liberation. Also, in the United
States, party membership fell more than 100,000 in 1919, to a
figure below 7,000 by the end of the decade, which seemed to
47indicate certain collapse. Only the Great Depression changed 
the Socialists' situation. With more than ten million workers
16
unemployed and bank failures, the Party began to grow rapidly
with Norman Thomas at the head, while in Europe the PSI
remained in exile. But, with the success of the New Deal
within American labor, the party, by the 1936 election, showed
a poorer percentage of national vote than in its first campaign
in 1900.^® From then on, the SP in the United States declined,
49until it abandoned electoral campaigning entirely after 1956.
In the early years of the present century, both Socialist 
parties were viable political forces that demanded attention. 
They excited the hopes of many, and alarmed countless others.
No matter how one felt about the Socialists, they could not 
be ignored. Why is it then, since mid-century in Italy, the 
Socialist Party gained back, retained, and strengthened its 
position on the political spectrum, while the Socialist Party 
in the United States (founded on the same premises) deteriorated 
to almost nothing? In fact, almost all the democratic nations 
of the Western world have a socialist party representing a 
significant political force. But, in the United States, an 
important country among the Western democracies, the Socialist 
Party disappeared. Hence, one needs to seek an explanation of 
this "death" of the Socialist Party in the United States in 
the mid-century, in contrast to the Italian Socialist 
Party’s ascendancy, despite the fact that the courses of both 
parties have been susceptible to similar positive and negative 
influences. In other words, at this point one needs to be 
concerned with socialist politics, not socialist theory.
Internal Factors
Membership in a political party in Italy is a more serious 
affair than it is in the United States. Due to its procedure
III. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ITALIAN AND
UNITED STATES SOCIALIST PARTIES RESPECTIVELY
17
18
and type of commitment it entails, membership in an Italian 
political party has been compared to membership in an American 
church. An Italian who wants to join the Socialist Party must 
have his name proposed and seconded by active party members.
On admission he must profess his sympathy with the basic tenets 
of the party, agree to follow the party line and pay monthly 
and annual dues. Eighteen years old is the minimum age for 
admission. The Party organization is based on local units, 
called sections. In addition to the section, which is a terri­
torial unit comprising a "commune," the PSI set up groups at 
the members' places of work which are called "nuclei." These 
sections elect their own officers and are united into provin­
cial or regional bodies, with the sovereign body of the party
being the National Congress.. This type of system places local
50issues as high priority.
In contrast, the Socialist Party in the United States 
never fully decided whether it was a political party, a 
political pressure group, a revolutionary sect, or a political 
forum. It tried to play all these roles at the same time. 
Outside of a few places, most notably Milwaukee and Oklahoma, 
the Socialists failed to build strong local and state organi­
zations. And it is at the local level that voting is donel 
Only in Milwaukee and Oklahoma and a few small cities did the 
Socialist Party have an organization in each precinct to dis­
tribute literature, get voters registered, get voters to the
19
polls, watch the count of the vote, and all other routine 
tasks of political party workers. Watching the count of the 
vote is a critical activity, especially critical to minor 
parties.
Unlike the Italians, the American Socialists never saw 
the value of political organization. In fact, Debs claimed 
during his 1916 campaign: "Let it not be supposed for a moment 
that on the part of the Socialists this is going to be a vote­
chasing campaign.... We shall explain socialism and make our 
appeal to the intelligence, the manhood and womanhood of the
people and upon that...high plane, whatever the outcome, we
52are bound to win." Nor did the American Socialists generally 
concern themselves with local issues. Their interests were 
nearly altogether in national and international matters. Rarely 
did the Socialist Party run a full slate of local and state 
candidates.
Evidence of the success the Party might have enjoyed if 
it had been more concerned with local affairs can be seen by 
those parts of the party that did concern themselves with 
such matters.
The Milwaukee Socialists offered the voters a local
53program, and they became the city's dominant party. Oklahoma 
Socialists became strong because of good organization and their 
concern with local matters. Lacking the money to finance a 
state socialist newspaper, Oklahoma Socialists arranged with
20
the publisher of the Socialist newspaper, Appeal to Reason,
to have inserted a special "Oklahoma page" in each copy mailed
54to Oklahoma which dealt with state and local affairs.
Furthermore, the Socialist Party in the United States 
failed to communicate with the public. A majority of the 
American people simply did not, and still do mot, understand 
Marxist jargon, so the party could have done better with more 
of the easily understood language found in the two socialist 
newspapers: Appeal to Reason and The National Rip Saw.
External Factors
But, despite all the shortcomings of the Socialist Party 
in the United States, its failure was not primarily its own 
fault. The failure of the Socialist Party in the United States 
was due less to its errors than to basic traditionas and con­
ditions in American society, which the Socialists could do
55little or nothing to change. The Socialist Party in Italy 
has made mistakes, yet the United States still remains one of 
the few important Western democracies where the Socialist Party 
did not offer a significant, mid-century to present, socialist 
movement. In other words, the existence of Old World conditions 
in Italy represents one of the major factors more conducive to 
the growth of Socialism than those conditions which were in 
existence in the United States.
21
a.
In Italy, with its parliamentary type government, the 
essential role of the political party in the democratic 
process is recognized in the Italian republican Constitution, 
which states in Article 49: "All citizens have the right to
associate freely in political parties in order to contribute 
through democratic procedure to the determination of national 
policy." In fact, Italy’s form of proportional representa­
tion used to elect both the Chamber of Deputies and the 
Senate means that the vote will always be fragmented and that
at least four political parties will be required to form a 
57government. in sharp contrast, there are many features of 
the American political system that hamper the development of 
any third party, whether socialist or not. The two-party system 
in the United States is so strong that no genuine third party 
has ever succeeded in becoming one of the major parties. Of 
course, there is one exception to this claim: the rise of the
Republican Party in 1854. However, in the West, where this 
party first gained ground, party discipline and an effective 
political machine had not been securely developed. It can be 
said that the conditions were more favorable to the emergence 
of a third party at that time then after the Civil War and to 
the present day. The election laws of most states make it 
difficult for third parties to get on the ballot and stay on. 
Also, the large amounts of money necessary to finance an election
22
ep
campaign handicap third parties. The two-party system is
very deeply ingrained in American voting habits. If all the
people who had subscribed to the Appeal to Reason to read
Deb’s editorials, and who had paid their money to hear Debs
speak, had voted for Debs, his percentage of the popular vote
should have been much higher than it ever was. The same is
true for Norman Thomas, whose measure of respect among the
American people was considerably higher than the vote they
59had given him. But, many voters are reluctant to vote for 
a candidate who does not have a good chance of winning i.e. 
reluctant to "throw away" votes. Yet these are difficulties 
of all third parties in America, which does not quite explain 
why the Socialist Party failed and why the Socialists never did 
as well as many other third parties.
b.
One reason that the American Socialist Party never developed 
the strength equal to their comrades in Italy was that, in 
the United States, there is considerably leas class conscious­
ness than there is in Italy or other Western nations. The 
Socialist parties of both countries directed their efforts to the 
"working class", "the proletariat," "the workers," but generally 
the members of this class in the United States, unlike Italy, 
failed to realize their class status. A lack of a feudal tradi­
tion, rapid economic expansion# early universal sufferage, and
23
class mobility helped to weaken and to prevent the development
of class consciousness in the United States. When Debs during
his war trial said, "While there is a lower class I am in it;
while there is a criminal element, I am of it; while there is
6 0a soul in prison, I am not free,” he expressed a noble 
sentiment, but few members of the ’working class" recognized 
the statement as an expression of solidarity with themselves. 
This is not to say that there are no social classes in America 
nor that there have been none, nor even that there has been 
no recognition of social class. It is to say, that in the 
United States class consciousness, and solidarity have been 
considerably weaker than in Italy, or Western Europe for that 
matter.
For example, late in the Great Depression, when millions 
were still unemployed, telmo Roper made a study of public 
opinion about social class. His conclusions were discouraging 
for the United States Socialist Party. When asked, "What would 
you use to name the class in America you belong to?" 27.7 per 
cent of those polled replied they did not know, indicating if 
the sample were a fair one, that about one-fourth of the 
American people were not aware of social class. The answers 
to his questions were such that Roper concluded that 79.2 per 
cent of the population believed itself to be middle class.
Of those whose incomes were so small that Roper considered 
them "poor," 70.3 per cent thought they were middle class.
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Only 7.9 per cent of the total considered themselves of the 
"lower" class. Of the factory workers polled only about one- 
third thought their interests and those of their employers were 
opposed. Hence, in a society with such disregard of social 
class, a political movement based primarily upon class appeal 
will have a difficult time.
The lack of a feudal tradition in America, the result 
largely of a new civilization on a continent with a vast amount 
of inexpensive land, is a major factor in the American people's 
failure to develop a class consciousness comparable to that 
of the people in the "Florida-size" Italy. When a modern- 
capitalistic system of production developed in the United 
States, it did not displace a large and settled class of crafts­
men, as happened in Italy. From the displaced artisans in 
Italy came movements which tended to create a sense of class 
solidarity among Italian workers. The absence of a need for 
unpropertied Americans to fight for the franchise and political 
representation tended to blur class lines. It was difficult 
for Italian workmen not to conclude that their states were for 
the advancement and protection of the propertied classes when
they had to struggle so long and hard with these classes for
6 3the right to participate in politics. The American worker, 
on the other hand, received the franchise relatively early and 
with comparative ease, leaving only social and economic lines 
between him and men of property, lines less definite than the 
political line had been.**'
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Similarly, since there has never been a firmly established
aristocracy based upon birth in the United States, the middle
class has never had a great struggle to assert its superiority.
The United States has had nothing comparable to the Italian
Risorgimento of the nineteenth century or even the French
Revolution in 1^89. This is significaht because when there has
been sharp conflict between aristocracies and a middle class,
radical and class-conscious ideas have gained circulation among
the working class. But in the United States, there has been
65no middle-class revolt as in Italy.
However, the lack of a feudal heritage has perhaps not 
been as important a factor in the development of class attitudes 
in the United States as has the relative success of American 
capitalism. Italy, long, narrow, mountainous, lack of raw 
material, and on the periphery of the European market, repre­
sents an economically poor country. In sharp contrast, the 
United States* exceptionally rich natural resources, its self- 
sufficient industries, and its large domestic market have com­
bined to produce a huge gross national product. The distribution 
of the product has been something less than equitable, but the 
total product has been such that the United States has enjoyed
a better standard of living than Italy and most other European 
6 6nations. The American economy has also, for the most part, 
been an expanding economy. One effect of the expansion of the 
American economy has been that as the rich became richer the
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poor did not, in the long run, become poorer. Of course,
industrial capitalism widened the gap between the wealthiest
families of the nation and the poorest, but the poor have
generally been able, except during economic depressions, to
look back upon their fathers' and grandfathers' status and
conclude that their own material comfort is greater. And the
widespread assumption that the future holds even greater
material comforts reflects an optimism that is not conducive
6 7to the development of a Socialist Party,
The growth of the American economy has also made possible
a relatively high degree of class mobility. It has been possible
for many able and ambitious young people of working-class
origins to escape from their class. And besides the actual
degree of class fluidity there is the essence of the American
Dream. A firm belief in the rags to riches is a part of
6 8American folklore. Young "heroes" are a real part of 
American beliefs, whether or not they actually exist. The 
actuality and the dream have combined to produce an optimism 
about one's ahances, or more importantly about one's 
childrens' chances to better their position in the social order, 
an optimism that has worked against the development of class 
consciousness. Americans have generally believed it easier and 
more desirable to rise from their class rather than with their 
class. For many, it would seem the belief proved justified.
One can speculate what might have happened had the American
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class structure been static (i.e. more similar to that of
Italy), it seems reasonable that there would have been more
69class consciousness and conflict.
Still another factor in United states' history that tended 
to hamper the development of class consciousness was the 
ethnic heterogeneity of American workers. In Italy, obviously 
the Italian workers who make up the Italian Socialist Party 
are Italian. However, the American working class has been 
composed of many races and nations, and there has been a 
tendency for American workers to identify themselves with 
their racial or nationality group rather than with their class. 
The steady stream of immigrants to the United States made the 
organization of American workers more than usually difficult. 
Due to the influx of thirteen million immigrants from 1900 to
1914, the non-English speaking groups in the Socialist Party
70rose from 25 percent in 1908 to over half by 1919. Most
American workers were not so aware of class antagonisms as they
were of religious, ethnic, and racial tensions. Also, the
aspirations of immigrants and Negroes to become assimulated,
presented a special problem for the Socialist Party in America.
For the Negro it was enough of a burden to be balck without
also being "red" while the immigrant who wanted to become an
"American" realized that being a Socialist would be a handicap
71to his assimulation.
28
c.
Although a major factor, the relative lack of class
consciousness of Americans was only one of several basic
conditions of American life that hampered the Socialists,
Perhaps because of the Socialists inadequate explanation
of their philosophy mo*t Americans f^lt that Socialism would
take away from their individualism. As seen in the statement
by former Secretary of State James F, Byrnes: "Socialism is
but a step toward communism," Americans have confused socialism
with communism and have recoiled from the "monolithic" Soviet 
72state. The Russian Revolution of 1917 and the subsequent
strained relations between the Soviet Union and the United
States were undoubtedly a factor in the decline of the Socialist
Party even though the Socialists were among the earliest of
73anticommunists•
d.
Another American condition that worked against Socialist 
success is the American's pragmatic view of life that demands 
visible and practical results, and the quicker the better.
Most of the tenets of the Socialist Party were not attractive 
to those who held such views. This type of "needs-must-be-met 
immediately” syndrome is indicative of the United States whose 
history of two hundred years pales in comparison to that of 
Italy, in Italy, one can sense the ability for patience in
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its people who have passed through thousands of years of
history. Victor Berger, an American Socialist claimed:
"Socialism is coming all the time. It may be another century
or two before it is fully established." In the meantime, there
was little to do but make the best of it and wait for a new
day. "Another century or two" for a country which has witnessed
the passing of 20 times that many does not seem too long to
wait for social justice. But to a country which has only a
"century or two" on which to base its history, this vague
promise of the "millennium" was not as attractive as the
prospect of achieving less, but achieving it soon through the
74major parties.
e.
The issue of governmental repression is yet another factor 
which inhibited the growth of the Socialist Party in America.
In Italy, the Socialist Party witnessed governmental supression 
during its Fascist Period; but this was true for all Italian 
political parties of that time. Ironically, in America, the 
"spokesman” for open societies, a long history of repressive 
acts against the Socialist Party, or, more generally, all 
radicals and Marxists aan be traced especially during the 
World War era. 5 The Socialist Party had difficulty renting 
halls for their meetings, had their meetings broken up by local 
police, suffered physical violence from mob action and encountered
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discrimination from anti-Socialist employers. After the
declaration of war, seven states passed acts abridging freedom
77of speech and press. However, it was the federal laws which 
inhibited the Socialists the most. The Espionage Act, which 
became law on June 15, 1917, granted the federal government the 
power to censor newspapers and ban them from the mails, and 
made the obstruction of the ^raft or enlistment service punish­
able by fine of up to ten thousand dollars and twenty years* 
imprisonment. Additional powers of censorship were given in 
the Trading-with-the-Enemy Act of October 6, 1917, and the 
amendment to the Espionage Act of May 16, 1918, sometimes called
the Sedition Act, which made even attempting to obstruct the
78draft a felony. Prior to the war, over two million people
79subscribed to socialist publications. Less than a month after 
the passage of the Espionage Act, Postmaster General Albert 
S. Burlison revoked the second class mailing privileges of 
the American Socialist of Chicago, the party's only official 
paper, for advertising a pamphlet which linked American partici­
pation in the war with House of Morgan Loans to the Allies. 
Before the war was over, nearly every Socialist newspaper and 
periodical were denied low-cost mailing rights. The Socialist
Party not only had problems with the Post Office Department,
80but also with the Department of Justice. All in all, over 
two thousand Socialists were indicted or convicted under the 
Espionage and Sedition Acts; such as; the Social leader Eugene
76
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Debs and Socialist agitator,Kate Richards O'Hare.
During the war, prosecutors and persecutors of the Social­
ists justified their actions on the grounds that the Socialist 
Party's opposition to the war endangered the nation. After 
the war no such justification on the ground of national self- 
interest existed, but there was no pause to stop the Socialist 
Movement. After November 1918, Socialists were being persecuted 
merely because they were Socialists; the antiradical hysteria 
increased rather than diminished after the war. Many state
legislatures passed what were known as "criminal syndicalist
8 2laws", acts that outlawed agitation for revolution. The
United States Commerce lobbied for a sedition act which would
make It criminal to utter remarks that "tended" to Incite 
8 3violence. When Congress met in a special session in April,
1919, the House of Representatives refused to seat Victor Berger
of the Socialist Party, who had been elected by his district
in Milwaukee. He was denied his seat because he was convicted
of violating the Espionage Act. At the time he was out of
prison waiting his appeal to the Supreme Court. A special
election was held and Berger won again. But again the House
84refused to seat him. In November, 1919, five state assembly 
districts in New York City elected Socialists to represent them 
at Albany. A special legislative committee was appointed to 
investigate the qualifications and eligibility of the five, 
which were in question only because they were members of the
81
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Socialist Party. The special committee recommended that the
five Socialists not be seated so the Assembly did not seat 
8 5them. The postwar "antiradical hysteria" decreased after 1920
but by this time the Socialist Party was no longer as potent
of a political force challenging mainstream American politicians
8 6and businessmen as it had been in the beginning of the century.
These, then are some of the basic conditions and traditions 
of American society in contrast to those of Italy that prevented 
the success of the Socialist Party in the United states. Both 
parties were founded on the Marxist doctrine that contends 
that national ownership and operation nf industry will end 
private profit and its inevitable by-produots of unemployment 
and war. Both envisaged a s y s t e m  that would eventually give 
to every membet oi society an egual supply of goods and services/ 
enough for all his needs, regardless of the Kind or guanfity 
of work he is able to contribute! Both experienced similar 
divisions and defeatioilS beyond the point of ever being suscept­
ible to a working coalition With the Communists> Both ihowed 
political prosperity prior to World War i. Finally, both 
parties had to contend with the differences that 
divided Socialist from Socialist i.a. faotiotliHsm. However, 
in spite of similar successes, as well as losses, the Italian 
Soalaliet Party has managed to become the "indispaneabie" 
third major party in Italy, while the American Socialist Party, 
as suoh, no longer exists. In a manner of speaking, one can
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say that it was American history t*at defeated the American 
Socialist Party and Old World history that promoted and promotes 
the Italian Socialist Party.
IV. CONCLUSIONS2 FUTURE SPECULATIONS
So where does this leave the Italian Socialist Party
today and is there a possibility of the Socialist Party’s
rebirth here in America? With respect of Italy as of March 3,
1987, Prime Minister Bettino Craxi resigned, ending Italy’s
8 7longest-standing postwar government. As mentioned before,
Mr. Craxi’s resignation was due to the accord reached last
July among the five party coalition. But the Socialists no
longer considered this pact binding. Hence, Parliament was
faced with two choices: formation of a new coalition government
of Christian Democrats, Socialists, Liberals, Republicans, and
Social Democrats with a Christian Democrat as Prime Minister
(most likely Mr. Giullo Andreotti) or, the call for new
88elections before 1988. On March 11, 1987, President Cossiga
89"unofficially" called Andreotti to form a government and by 
March 17, Prime Minister-designate Andreotti had drawn up a 
proposal to satisfy the leaders of the five-party coalition 
(especially Bettino Craxi) in order to "avert premature 
elections.
The Socialist Party of Italy has demonstrated their 
capacity to lead the nation out of the deep economic and poli­
tical crisis in which Italy found itself in the 1980s. Due 
to the Socialist Party's stay in power i.e. as in the prime 
ministership, the minority parties or "laic pole" have increased 
their proportion of votes while the Christian Democrats and
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Communists Parties percentages have continually declined.
Plus, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) seems ready to dissolve
itself and join the Socialist Party, while the "rival"
Republicans have become more friendly. Radicals and liberals
are joining the Socialists in attempt to cure Italy's troubled
91justice system. Following Craxi's resignation, La Stamps
polled the Italian public concerning the success of the
Socialist government. According to that poll, sixty-four
percent of those polled felt that Craxi's government had been
sufficient to outstanding. Only the government of De Gasperi
92in 1948 received a higher percentage.
For the elections, the PSI will run on Craxi's record 
and is expected to do well. In the electoral campaign, the PSI 
will push for several institutional reforms that should stabilize 
the country further. These include modifying the "secret 
vote" and direct election of the Italian president. Further­
more, the PSI propose two significant alterations in the parlia­
mentary system, both from West Germany. By setting a minimum 
of five percent for representatives in Parliament and allowing 
decree laws to stand if Parliament does not specifically reject 
them within sixty days— as opposed to the present rule requiring
acceptance within sixty days— Craxi with the PSI hope to unclog
93the legislative procedures in Italy's Parliament.
in sum, despite the fact that the party has only 11.4 
per cent of the vote, the Socialist Party in Italy plays an
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indispensable role in the coalition and will continue to do so 
because it is essential to the existence of the five-party 
coalition. As can be seen from the recent resignation of 
Prime Minister Andreotti (DC) only three weeks after Craxi's 
resignation— the Socialist Party is still a forceful party.
Mr. Andreotti informed President Cossiga on March 27, 1987, 
that he was unable to resolve a dispute between his party 
(DC's) and the PSI. in other words, no Socialist Party 
participation, no government. Therefore, the Italian Socialist 
Party is still the determined holder of the balance of power.
in sharp contrast, a rebirth of an American party under 
the Socialist Party title, is not probable. There are too 
many conditions and traditions working against its revival. 
However, there may exist a possibility to begin a new social­
ist party if one is able to remove as many as possible of the 
obstacles to its formation and functioning. The majority of 
voters in this country hesitate to select one of the existing 
socialist parties because that would label them with a certain 
radical character. Most feel that socialism has an "unsavory" 
past to live down either intellectually, politically, or 
morally. Furthermore, anything under the label of "socialism” 
promotes alien and foreign connotations in what one might 
define the "average American." To avoid the stigma of a 
century of "socialist nega^iveneaa," a new title for the party 
omitting the term "Socialist" could prove to be effective
because the public's displeasure must not always be mistaken 
for an intellectual opposition. In a sense, an attempt should 
be made to create an entirely new party made up of as many 
as possible of the known members from each of the present 
socialist parties. Of course, some people will claim that 
deliberately avoiding the use of the word "Socialist," in the 
title, would be dishonest. But, if all the facts and princ­
iples are laid out before the persons who are interested in 
becoming party members, then this kind of political appeal is 
honest and would be a "certificate" of trust issued to the 
public. In conclus'on, there aan be no revival or survival 
for an American party under the stigma--Socialist} under 
another descriptive term— cooperative— perhaps.
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